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HARD LAW AND MANDATE FOR JUSTICE 
Maimon Schwarzschild* 
The question is whether the Constitution should be treated as 
"hard law" and interpreted essentially the way the Uniform Com-
mercial Code or the Motor Vehicles Law is interpreted, or whether 
the constitution should be treated as a more general mandate to do 
justice and create as far as possible a good society. 
If this were a multiple choice test, I think the only correct an-
swer would be: Both of the above. 
If this were a "short-answer" -type exam, I would write: The 
Constitution is "hard law" and it is a general source of inspira-
tion-and its authority as each depends largely on the other. 
For my essay-type answer I want to use a yachting metaphor: 
if you want to win the America's Cup, your boat needs both a keel 
and a sail (or even to put yourself in a plausible position to litigate 
about it). The constitution's authority depends on its keel-its hard 
law dimension-in conjunction with its sail-its expression and ad-
vancement of the evolving ideals of the society. 
Now, the test of whether a constitution really counts as an ex-
pression of ideals is whether the constitution occasionally makes 
possible a moral breakthrough, showing that the ideals are alive. 
For most Americans today, I think Brown v. Board of Education 
represents such a constitutional breakthrough. 
It seems to me that people came to accept Brown v. Board of 
Education, even though the result of the case was controversial at 
the time, because the decision relied on a constitution that has a 
reassuringly solid, legal quality, rather than relying merely on some 
general principle or bromide that could be used by anybody anytime 
to mean anything at all. 
In exactly the same way, people accept the often-arbitrary 
"hard-law" provisions of the constitution-after all, why should a 
34-year-old be disqualified to be president, why should money bills 
have to originate in the House of Representatives, why should 
Rhode Island have as many U.S. Senators as New York-because 
these provisions are found in a document that also embodies the 
• Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Barrister of Lincoln's Inn, London. 
87 
88 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:87 
ideals that people respect, a document that underwrites break-
throughs like Brown v. Board of Education which most people even-
tually come to be proud of. 
If keel and sail are dependent on each other in this way, if 
neither would have much authority without the other, you would 
not expect the U.S. Constitution to be unique in having both dimen-
sions. And indeed, in other legal systems there coexist the "hard-
law" quality and what might be called the quality of "inspiration." 
For purposes of comparison, let me suggest two examples from 
very different cultures. 
The English common law was traditionally full of legalistic 
complexity, notorious for being bound by precedent, full of techni-
calities, full of the "quiddities" of the law. But the common law 
was also the "heritage of the free-born Englishman," the essence of 
justice under law, the thing that for centuries distinguished the 
humblest Englishman from what he considered the servile, con-
temptible French peasant. This may be why legal language, legal 
metaphors turn up in virtually every act of every Shakespeare play. 
As E.P. Thompson and others have made clear, the law (with all its 
injustices) entered proudly into ordinary people's sense of who they 
were and of what it was to be English. And if the common law had 
both keel and sail, the values we might identify with the sail dimen-
sion made possible the breakthrough decisions of the English com-
mon law-the decision guaranteeing the right of the jury to return a 
verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the decision abolishing slav-
ery, and so on. 
The second example is that of Jewish law (called Halacha in 
Hebrew) and Islamic law (called Sharia in Arabic). (The two sys-
tems are so congruent in structure and in ethos that it is only fair to 
treat them conceptually as one system.) These systems, again, are 
hard law, technical, sometimes hypertechnical in a way that non-
semites disparage as "Talmudic." Yet for orthodox Jews and Mus-
lims the law is also literally God's gift to mankind: the living em-
bodiment of what is good, so that studying and practicing the law is 
the supreme way for human beings to live a Godly life, with all that 
that implies in cultures pervaded by religious emotion. 
Perhaps in every legal system, the sail dimension reinforces the 
authority of the keel dimension, and vice versa. In a constitutional 
democracy, this mutual reinforcement goes a long way toward 
resolving the twin paradoxes of constitutionalism, namely "Why do 
free citizens continue to accept rules-some of them very specific 
and perfectly arbitrary-laid down two hundred years ago?" and 
"Why do free citizens accept decisions about controversial public 
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questions by unelected judges invoking the inspiration of the Con-
stitution?" The answer seems to be that they wouldn't accept the 
one if it weren't for the other: that a 200-year-old road-vehicles 
code couldn't remotely be enforced today, any more than people 
would accept grand Supreme Court decisions that relied solely on 
some general injunction to do justice, pursue righteousness, or build 
Socialism in One Country. 
Needless to say, the point here is not that the Constitution has 
some "hard law" provisions, and some uninhibited "do-justice" 
provisions, and never the twain shall meet, but rather that virtually 
any act of constitutional interpretation, in order to be plausible, 
needs to be true to both constitutional dimensions. 
Now, I have been relying on my keel-sail metaphor, but here is 
where the usefulness of that metaphor comes to an end. (You can't 
push any metaphor too far.) You might be able to calculate pre-
cisely, at least in theory, just how much keel and how much sail you 
need (say) to win the America's Cup. But there is no "science" of 
an effective constitution that would lend itself to any such calcula-
tion because the variables are too many and too subjective: history, 
politics, psychology, what the Annales historians call "mental-
ites" -all are factors in the very changeable balance of keel (hard 
law) and sail (high ideal) in American constitutionalism at any 
given time. 
The truth is that people rightly want constitutional continuity, 
predictability, stability, law-likeness. People also rightly want jus-
tice, goodness, and wisdom. (And some people want utopia, or at 
least they want an effort to approximate utopia through constitu-
tional interpretation.) 
But you cannot have both perfect law-likeness and the quest 
for perfect justice in constitutional interpretation. What is more, it 
is very unlikely you really want either in perfect form. Perfect law-
likeness, in the sense of "hard-and-fast rules," would be intolerably 
static, the legal equivalent of the architecture of the Pharaohs in the 
Valley of the Kings. Perfectly utopian constitutional interpretation 
would be equally frightening. Your idea of utopia and mine are 
different, and the history of the twentieth century illustrates the 
gruesome things that happen-the gulags, Thousand Year Reichs, 
collectivisation famines-that happen when people fight out their 
conflicting visions of utopia unrestrained by "hard law." 
If the constitution should not be only hard law, or only utopian 
inspiration, and if it cannot perfectly be both at the same time, then 
the only remaining possibility is for the constitution to be imper-
fectly law-like and at the same time imperfectly a mandate to do 
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justice. Constitutionalism is a rough compromise between the con-
flicting "goods" of hard law and utopian inspiration: a compromise 
between "goods" that are fundamentally irreconcilable with each 
other, "goods" either of which, if pushed too far at the expense of 
the other, might not tum out to be so very good at all. 
It is this inescapable element of muddle and compromise that 
keeps constitutional interpretation interesting, and prevents consti-
tutional law from ever becoming a cut-and-dried science. And after 
all, in between law suits they are still running the America's Cup 
race: the yacht-engineers don't seem to be anywhere near to crack-
ing the keel-sail problem just yet, either. 
